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INTRODUCTION
In July 2009, The Washington Post ran a 1600-word story about a former
Kenyan hotel executive turned ―leadership coach‖ who teaches baby
boomer executives how to understand their younger employees.1 That
 Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 60; J.D.
Candidate, May 2012, American University, Washington College of Law; B.S., Journalism,
2000, James Madison University. I gratefully acknowledge professors Peter Jaszi and
Stephen Wermiel for their feedback and advice, and my Note and Comment editor, Jim
Turner, for his outstanding suggestions and guidance throughout the writing process.
Thanks also to my family and friends, particularly Brett Zongker and Margaret McElligott,
for their endless support. Finally, a special thanks to my former colleagues at The
Associated Press, whose dedication to top-notch journalism gave me the inspiration for this
Comment.
1. Ian Shapira, Speaking to Generation Nexus, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, at C1.

same day, a condensed version of the story appeared on the culture and
media website Gawker featuring quotes, biographical information and other
tidbits—all cut-and-pasted or rewritten from the Post.2 Just like that, in a
process that took roughly thirty minutes, Gawker was able to republish and
generate advertising revenue off a story that took Post staff writer Ian
Shapira hours to report and about a full day to write.3
Gawker‘s unauthorized use of the Post‘s content illustrates an increasing
problem in the Internet age that threatens to cripple organizations that
invest in original reporting, thereby harming American democracy by
leaving citizens less informed.4 While readers are flocking online to get
their news,5 news originators like the Post are earning little revenue from
online advertising.6 This is partly because with a few mouse clicks, anyone
with Internet access can copy news stories online and repost the
information while it is fresh,7 eliminating the typical ―lead time‖ advantage
of being first.8 This activity—commonly referred to as free-riding9—costs
2. Compare id. (showing the original Washington Post story), with Hamilton Nolan,
„Generational Consultant‟ Holds America‟s Fakest Job, GAWKER.COM (July 9, 2009, 11:52
AM),
http://gawker.com/5310986/generational-consultant-holds-americas-fakest-job
(showing Gawker‘s version of the Post story).
3. See Ian Shapira, How Gawker Ripped Off My Story & Why It‟s Destroying
Journalism* *And There‟s Pretty Much Nothing I Can Do About It, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2009, at B1 (explaining that the Post writer conducted a lengthy phone interview with
leadership coach Anne Loehr, traveled to Loehr‘s two-hour seminar, and spent four hours
transcribing the session).
4. There has always been some form of free-riding with respect to news, but prior to
the Internet the reproduction costs were greater and there was more of a lag-time to
reproduce content. See Ryan T. Holte, Note, Restricting Fair Use to Save the News: A
Proposed Change in Copyright Law to Bring More Profit to News Reporting, 13 J. TECH. L.
& POL‘Y 1, 12 (2008) (explaining that newspapers and broadcasters could choose when to
release stories so as not to allow competitors to repeat them during peak hours, and in some
cases not until the following day); see also David Marburger & Dan Marburger, Op-Ed.,
.Com Internet Parasites, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at A28 (asserting that while television
stations have long aired rewritten newspaper stories, those broadcasts were not direct
substitutes for newspapers, unlike Internet aggregators).
5. See Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism & Pew Internet & American Life
Project, Online:
Audience Behavior, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2010,
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/online_audience.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2011)
(finding that sixty-one percent of Americans typically get their news online each day, a
greater share than newspapers).
6. Cf. Marburger, supra note 4 (noting that although the San Francisco Chronicle‘s
website attracts millions of readers, the paper almost closed recently because it was losing
massive amounts of money).
7. See Brief Amici Curiae of Advance Publ‘ns, Inc. et al. Not in Support of Any Party
at 9, Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2d Cir. June 22,
2010) (hereinafter Amici Curiae of Advance Publ‘ns) (explaining that modern technology
allows a free-rider to immediately republish original news content and earn revenue from
that content).
8. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995)
(stating that situations in which a plaintiff is deprived of its lead time provide ―the most
compelling case for protection against appropriation‖).
9. See Chi. Prof‘l Sports LP v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir.
1992) (defining free-riding as ―the diversion of value from a business rival‘s efforts without
payment‖).

next to nothing, allowing websites that heavily excerpt news stories to
compete directly with news originators for readers while driving down the
cost of ads and the value of original news content.10
Although the public typically benefits from increased competition, those
who free-ride on news originators have the opposite effect.11 First, freeriders are not more efficient at reporting the news (they are not reporting at
all); they are simply taking news obtained by others.12 While free-riders
can survive with steeply discounted advertising, companies that gather and
report the news cannot because they must bear the enormous cost of
gathering information.13 Second, these free-riders are siphoning away
readers from newspaper websites. Assuming a site such as Gawker even
bothers to link to the original story, there is often little reason for someone
to read the same material twice.14 The result: fewer clicks on a newspaper
website hurt the paper‘s ability to recover its costs through advertising,
subscriptions, and content-licensing, which in turn leaves less money to
invest in newsgathering.15

10. See Marburger, supra note 4 (discussing the practice of surrounding rewritten news
stories with inexpensive ads).
11. The practice of free-riding on the news comes in various forms. In some cases, a
website such as Google News will use software that combs the Internet for headlines and the
first few sentences of a story and then repost the information onto the free-rider‘s own sites.
See KIMBERLY ISBELL, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, THE RISE OF THE NEWS AGGREGATOR:
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670339
(detailing the various models of news aggregators). In other cases, similar to the Gawker
example above, the website will hire its own staff to troll the Internet for news and then
rewrite the stories—sometimes even claiming credit for the content. See, e.g., Associated
Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining
that All Headline News was accused of hiring ―poorly paid individuals‖ to find stories
online and then rewrite and publish the stories under its own name).
12. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who owns The Wall Street Journal, has equated
aggregators with thieves. See David Sarno, Murdoch Accuses Google of News Theft, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at B1 (quoting Murdoch, who argued that: ―[t]heir almost wholesale
misappropriation of our stories is not fair use. To be impolite, it‘s theft‖).
13. See Amici Curiae of Advance Publ‘ns, supra note 7, at 9–10 (pointing out that news
organizations spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to pay the salaries of reporters
and editors and to send journalists to war zones and other remote locations where news
occurs, which is a cost that free-riders do not face). Indeed, major newspapers are ailing
across the country as ad revenue plummets. See Douglas A. McIntyre, The 10 Most
Endangered
Newspapers
in
America,
TIME
(Mar.
9,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1883785,00.html (highlighting those
newspapers that have already closed and those that are at the greatest risk of closing).
14. Even the author of a newspaper story detailing how his story was republished by a
free-rider admits he probably would not have read the piece if he first saw the condensed
version that appeared on a blog. See Shapira, supra, note 3 (contemplating whether the
average blog visitor would click on a hyperlink to the original news provider after reading
the condensed version, and answering: ―I probably wouldn‘t have‖).
15. See generally Jennifer Saba, More Readers Skimming Google Headlines Than
Going Directly to Newspaper Web Sites?, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, (Jan. 19, 2010), available
at http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Headlines/more-readers-skimming-google-headlinesthan-going-directly-to-newspaper-web-sites-27131-.aspx (explaining that readers are
increasingly skimming headlines on news aggregator sites rather than clicking on newspaper
websites).

Media organizations are increasingly fighting back against those who
republish their content without authorization,16 but putting a stop to freeriding is problematic and better legal remedies are needed.17 Copyright law
is not always useful because while it protects expression, it does not protect
facts.18
One such legal solution is hot news misappropriation, a doctrine that
stems from the law of unfair competition.19 The doctrine, which the
Supreme Court established more than ninety years ago in International
News Service v. Associated Press,20 (―INS‖), allows the original publisher
of a news story to prevent a competitor from using the facts, ―until its
commercial value as news . . . has passed away.‖21 The Supreme Court has
never directly revisited INS, and legal scholars question whether the
doctrine remains viable in light of the 1976 Copyright Act‘s federal
preemption provision22 and the Court‘s modern rulings on free speech.23
Today, only a handful of states recognize hot news misappropriation.24
16. See, e.g., All Headline News, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 457–58 (detailing that Associated
Press (AP) sued All Headline News for allegedly rewriting AP stories and then passing them
off as its own); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 3–9, Dow Jones & Co. v.
Briefing.com, Inc., No. 1: 10-cv-03321-VM (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2010) (hereinafter
Dow Jones Complaint) (describing Dow Jones‘ lawsuit against briefing.com for
misappropriating its news and headlines in near real-time); First Amended Complaint for
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Copyright Infringement ¶ 20–93, Agence France
Presse v. Google, Inc., No. 1: 05-cv-00546-GK (D.D.C. filed Apr. 29, 2005) (outlining
Agence France Presse‘s lawsuit against Google over the unauthorized use of its headlines,
stories, and photos). Besides these cases, the Las Vegas Review-Journal is suing more than
thirty websites for copyright infringement for using the newspaper‘s content without
permission. See James Rainey, Review-Journal Bares Its Claws, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2010,
at D1 (describing dozens of lawsuits filed against publishers, such as a blog for cat
enthusiasts to sites about sports betting and advertising).
17. See generally Bruce W. Sanford & Bruce D. Brown, Laws That Could Save
Journalism, WASH. POST, May 16, 2009, at A15 (suggesting myriad solutions to support the
ailing news business, including a recommendation to federalize the hot news doctrine).
18. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (stating
that facts and ideas within a work are ―free for the taking‖). For example, as further
illustrated in the text accompanying endnotes 173–77, the facts within a news story (e.g. the
number of people killed in a plane crash) are free for others to use, but the way those facts
are stated and arranged in a news story is protected expression.
19. FTC Staff Discussion Draft: Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the
Reinvention of Journalism, FED. TRADE COMM‘N, 8, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/docs/new-staff-discussion.pdf (hereinafter
FTC Staff Discussion Draft) (discussing that hot news misappropriation can protect an
organization‘s investment in the facts for a limited time) (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
20. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
21. Id. at 245.
22. See infra note 234 (pointing out the differing viewpoints on the issue of
preemption).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 134–142 (explaining how First Amendment
doctrine has evolved since INS).
24. See Bruce W. Sanford et al., Saving Journalism with Copyright Reform and the
Doctrine of Hot News, 26 COMM. LAW. 8, 9 (2009) (stating that the hot news
misappropriation doctrine is recognized in five states). Those states are: California, Illinois,
Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th
Cir. 2003) (applying Illinois law); Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841,

This Comment will argue that in addition to remaining viable, hot news
misappropriation is an increasingly important legal tool in the digital era
that more states should embrace—particularly to protect original
newsgathering. However, to ensure that hot news misappropriation
survives federal preemption and does not encroach on free speech rights,
this Comment will suggest a framework that courts should follow to ensure
that the doctrine is narrowly applied.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the limitations of copyright
protections, the history of hot news misappropriation, and how courts have
addressed the seemingly divergent goals of the First Amendment and
intellectual property rights. Part II will argue that copyright law cannot
adequately protect news organizations in the digital age, leaving a void that
a narrow application of hot news misappropriation should fill. This Part
will also recommend that courts should apply the doctrine by building on a
legal framework first established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Finally, Part III will argue that this narrow application of hot news
misappropriation is not federally preempted and that the doctrine has the
same policy goals as the First Amendment.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Copyright Law‟s Limited Protection of Facts
News organizations generally turn first to copyright law when seeking to
halt the unauthorized republication of their content.25 Copyright is the
primary legal tool for protecting works of authorship in the United States,26
and its importance is underscored by the fact that federal copyright
protections have existed almost since the nation‘s inception.27 The

845 (2d. Cir. 1997) (applying New York law); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d
974, 980 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (applying California law); Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres,
Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (applying Missouri
law); Pottstown Daily News Publ‘g Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 192 A.2d 657, 663–64 (Pa.
1963) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com,
700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (asserting that New York is the most enthusiastic
supporter of hot news).
25. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (holding that
Theflyonthewall.com infringed copyrights by engaging in ―verbatim copying of key
excerpts‖ of seventeen research reports published by Morgan Stanley and Lehman
Brothers); see also Rainey, supra note 16, at D1 (reporting that a newspaper filed more than
thirty copyright infringement lawsuits against websites and blogs that were using its content
without permission).
26. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 411 (5th ed. 2010) (characterizing copyright law as ―a principal
means for protecting works of authorship‖ and noting that it is a broad domain that is
continuously expanding).
27. The first federal copyright act was passed in 1790, three years after the Constitution
was adopted. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.

Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to ―secur[e] for limited Times
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.‖28
Despite the importance of copyright, the law‘s protections are limited.
While copyright protects an author‘s original expression, it does not protect
the facts, ideas, or information within a work.29 Copyright protection is
also limited by the ―fair use‖ doctrine (codified in the 1976 Copyright Act),
which allows for the sharing of copyrighted material without the owner‘s
authorization for certain purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, and research.30 Finally, copyright protections do not
last indefinitely; the law generally offers protections for the life of the
author, plus seventy years.31 Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart
articulated a key policy reason for these limitations in Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken:32 ―Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.‖33
1.

Copyright and original expression
Before 1991, courts sometimes awarded copyrights to works that lacked
original expression, provided the data or facts were gathered
independently.34 Generally, these courts wanted to encourage authors to
invest the time and labor needed to create databases and other fact-based
works requiring significant research because these works would have broad

28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (―In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.‖).
30. Id. § 107 (explaining that in addition to the purposes for which a work will be used,
courts should also consider ―the nature of the copyrighted work; []the amount and
substantiality of the portion used . . . ; and the effect of the use on the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work‖). Congress has indicated that the factors listed in § 107 are
illustrative rather than exhaustive. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (explaining that because an infinite number of
circumstances can potentially arise in the fair use context courts must be free to apply the
fair use doctrine on a case-by-case basis).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). For a joint work prepared by at least two authors who did not
work for hire, copyright lasts for the life of the last surviving author plus seventy years after
the last surviving author‘s death. Id. § 302(b). If the work is anonymous, pseudonymous,
or made for hire, the copyright lasts either ninety-five years from the year of its first
publication, or 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
32. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
33. Id. at 156; see also Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the
Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 420
(1983) (stating that copyright seeks ―to give the gatherer of information an incentive [to
create] against the countervailing need to give the public free access to ideas‖).
34. See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128,
132 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the facts in a telephone directory were copyrightable);
Jeweler‘s Circular Publ‘g Co. v. Keystone Publ‘g Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922) (stating
that the right to copyright a book does not depend on whether its contents are original).

benefits to society.35 This approach, first articulated by a U.S. court in
1922,36 came to be known as the ―sweat of the brow‖ doctrine.37 Nearly
seventy years later, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected ―sweat of the
brow‖ in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,38 a case involving
two competing telephone directory white pages. Rural Telephone Service
was a public utility that annually published a directory that alphabetically
listed the names of its subscribers, their towns, and phone numbers.39 Feist,
a publishing company that specialized in telephone directories, lacked
independent access to Rural‘s subscriber information and offered to pay
Rural for the rights to use its listings.40 When Rural refused, Feist copied
the information anyway.41 In the end, more than 1300 of Feist‘s listings
were identical to Rural‘s.42 Rural sued for copyright infringement, but the
Court rejected its claim and held that not all copying is copyright
infringement.43
As explained by the Feist Court, copyright infringement requires two
elements: (1) the owner must hold a valid copyright, and (2) the alleged
infringer must copy elements of an original work.44 The Court quickly
determined that the first element was not an issue by finding that Rural‘s
telephone directory, as a whole, was copyrightable because it contained
some original expression such as foreword text and yellow pages
advertisements.45 The second element, Feist‘s copying of 1300 listings,
was problematic. The Court stated that even if Rural was the first to
discover and publish the names, towns, and phone numbers in a telephone
directory, this information already existed—and would continue to exist—

35. See generally Charles Brill, Legal Protection of Collection of Facts, 1998
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 1, 2 (1998) (discussing that when compilers put raw data into
searchable databases it benefits society by making the information readily accessible and
digestible, and warning that society will lose these benefits if the compilers of this data can
no longer recoup their investment).
36. See Jeweler‟s Circular Publ‟g Co., 281 F. at 88 (explaining that when a person
records the names, addresses, and occupations of a town‘s inhabitants, he is the author of
that material, and commenting further that ―[h]e produces by his labor a meritorious
composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of
multiplying copies of his work‖).
37. E.g., Earth Flag Ltd. v. Alamo Flag Co., 154 F. Supp. 2d 663, 668 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citation omitted) (explaining that the underlying principle behind the ―sweat of the
brow‖ doctrine was to offer ―copyright [as] a reward for the hard work that went into
compiling facts‖).
38. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
39. Id. at 342.
40. Id. at 342–43.
41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 344.
43. Id. at 361.
44. Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548
(1985) (providing the basis for Feist‘s two-part test by explaining that while a work as a
whole may be copyrighted, non-original elements within that work are free for the taking).
45. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.

regardless of whether the directory was ever published.46 Put more simply,
the names, towns, and phone numbers were facts that no one could claim as
their own.47
This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to
find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has
merely discovered its existence. . . . The same is true of all facts—
48
scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day.

Thus, even though Rural had a valid copyright for its directory, the facts
within the directory remained free for others to use.49 Copyright protection
is limited to the particular selection or arrangement of those facts.50
The Court explained that although it may seem unfair that a competitor
can use the fruit of another‘s labor without compensation, it is ―the essence
of copyright‖ and a constitutional requirement that others be allowed to
freely build on information contained in a work.51 Yet, the Court also
commented, without further elaboration, that in certain circumstances the
fruits of research may be protectable outside of copyright law under the
theory of unfair competition.52
2.

Copyright and fair use
The fair use doctrine also limits a plaintiff‘s ability to recover under
copyright law. Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act states: ―[T]he fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . .
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.‖53 Section
107 then lists four factors for the courts to consider when determining
whether the use is fair: (1) the purpose of the use, including whether it is
for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount of the work that is used, and (4) the

46. Id. The Court explained that ―[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality.‖ Id. at
345.
47. Id. at 347.
48. Id. at 347–48 (emphasis added). The Court referenced INS to explain that the news
element within a work is not copyrightable because it is not the creation of the writer, but
rather ―the history of the day.‖ Id. at 353–54.
49. Id. at 349.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 349–50 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
52. Id. at 354. One commentator notes that despite this suggestion by the Court, it is
not clear how unfair competition law would provide protection for the fruits of labor. See S.
Leigh Fulwood, Feist v. Rural: Did the Supreme Court Give License to Reap Where One
Has Not Sown?, 9 COMM. LAW. 15, 16 (1991) (calling the Court‘s remark about unfair
competition ―cryptic‖ and noting that the Court supported its language with a treatise that is
equally unclear).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (emphasis added).

effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.54 The
House report that accompanied § 107 indicates that courts are not expected
to follow a specific formula when considering these factors.55 Instead, the
fair use doctrine should be applied on a case-by-case basis using an
―equitable rule of reason‖ analysis.56
The only Supreme Court ruling involving fair use and news reporting is
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.57
In that case, The Nation magazine received a leaked manuscript of
President Ford‘s autobiography and published an unauthorized excerpt,
thereby ―scooping‖ Time magazine, which had paid for the exclusive rights
to print prepublication excerpts.58 The Nation admitted to directly copying
portions of the manuscript author‘s original language, but argued that its
actions constituted fair use of copyrighted material.59 The Second Circuit
agreed, holding that the purpose of the article was ―news reporting,‖ which
is specifically mentioned as an example of activities that may be considered
fair use under section 107.60
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the article‘s news content was
just one factor to consider.61 The Court went on to examine each of the
four factors in section 107, ruling against The Nation for each one.62 For
the first factor, the Court determined that the article‘s commercial
publication, rather than nonprofit use, weighed against fair use.63 For the
second factor, the Court explained that the law ―generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.‖64 Although this language seemed to favor The Nation, the Court
explained that the magazine focused on the most expressive elements of the
Ford manuscript rather than the brief phrases or quotes necessary to
disseminate the facts.65 For the third factor, the Court noted that although
the words quoted by The Nation were a small portion of the manuscript,
they were ―essentially the heart of the book.‖66 Finally, for the fourth
54. Id.
55. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, ch. 1, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5679–80.
56. Id. at 65.
57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
58. Id. at 542.
59. See id. at 548 (explaining that 300 to 400 words were directly copied, constituting
about thirteen percent of The Nation article).
60. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983);
rev‟d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see supra text accompanying note 53 (quoting
§ 107).
61. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (explaining that § 107 was not intended to
provide a list of uses that automatically qualified as fair use).
62. Id. at 561–69.
63. Id. at 562.
64. Id. at 563.
65. Id. at 563–64.
66. Id. at 564–65.

factor, the Court determined that The Nation‘s actions significantly
undermined the potential market for the copyrighted work.67 In this case,
Time canceled its plans to write about the Ford manuscript and refused to
pay $12,500 to Harper & Row.68
B. The Emergence and Evolution of Hot News Misappropriation
When copyright law is unable to provide adequate relief, some news
organizations have turned to another doctrine: hot news misappropriation.
Hot news has been called ―one of the strangest torts in intellectual property
law‖—in part because it protects facts already in the public domain.69 A
United States court first addressed whether a news organization‘s facts
could be protected by the law in 1876.70 But INS, decided more than thirty
years later, marked the first time the Supreme Court established hot news
misappropriation by ruling that news, gathered at great expense, was
entitled to protection, otherwise the information provider might cease to
exist.71
INS and hot news‟ beginnings
INS involved two wire services that were competing to deliver news
about World War I to newspapers across the United States.72 International
News Service (―INS‖) had been kicked out of Europe, leaving the company
without reporters to cover the war and prompting INS to rely on dispatches
from The Associated Press (AP).73 The AP alleged that INS was obtaining
its stories in several ways: from early-edition newspapers on the East
Coast, by reading bulletin board postings, or even by bribing AP
1.

67. Id. at 566–67. The Court stated that the fourth element was the most important
factor to determining fair use. Id. at 566. But nine years later, the Court backed away from
that stance. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding
that the fourth factor provides no evidentiary presumption of whether the use is fair).
68. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
69. See Stephen M. Kramarsky, „Hot News‟ Tort Swats Flyonthewall.com, N.Y.L.J.,
(Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202447125430 (explaining that the
use of publicly available information does not usually infringe on any legal rights). The
author also states that hot news is unusual because one of the elements is ―sweat of the
brow,‖ which the Supreme Court rejected in 1991. Id.; see also supra notes 38–52 and
accompanying text (discussing Feist and the Court‘s rationale for rejecting ―sweat of the
brow‖).
70. See VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, NEWS PIRACY AND THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE:
ORIGINS IN LAW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 43–44 (2005) (―It would be an
atrocious doctrine to hold that dispatches, the result of the diligence and expenditure of one
man, could with impunity be pilfered and published by another.‖ (quoting Kiernan v.
Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876))).
71. Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918); EKSTRAND, supra
note 70, at 43–44.
72. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 229–30.
73. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 47 (explaining that INS reporters were kicked off
the continent because both Europeans and Congress believed INS Chief William Randolph
Hearst was pro-German).

employees.74 INS, according to AP, then rewrote the stories to sell to INS
clients out West.75 Despite INS‘ behavior, the Court had few tools with
which to help AP: there was no copyright infringement because in most
instances INS was simply copying the facts,76 and there was no theft of
trade secrets because AP‘s stories were accessible to the public.77 The
Court, however, made it clear that it was nevertheless disturbed by INS‘
business practices:
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized
interference with the normal operation of [AP‘s] legitimate business
precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a
material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who
have not; with special advantage to [INS] in the competition because of
the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering
78
the news.

The Court ruled that INS could be enjoined from using the AP‘s stories
because it was engaged in a form of unfair competition.79 The Court
declined to elaborate on how long the injunction should last.80 Instead, the
Court reaffirmed the language of the district court in stating that INS was
prevented from using AP‘s content until the commercial value of AP‘s
news ―‗has passed away.‘‖81 The Court stated that without providing such
protection, the AP could no longer justify the cost of gathering the news.82
Unfortunately for the lower courts, the INS decision provided little
guidance about when hot news misappropriation applies and how long
news should remain ―hot.‖83 More than a decade after the decision, Judge
Learned Hand—then sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals—
warned of the difficulties of expanding INS‘ holding beyond the narrow
facts of the case because it ―flagrantly conflict[ed]‖ with copyright and
patent laws.84 INS‘ precedential value also was limited because federal
74. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 234 (observing that the ―news element . . . is not the creation of the writer,
but . . . [rather] the history of the day‖).
77. See id. at 235 (noting that news gets its value by being spread to the world, not by
remaining a secret).
78. Id. at 240.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 245–46 (declining to specify the exact terms of the injunction because of
the ―practical difficulties‖ of the case).
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. See id. at 240–41 (stating that ―[t]he cost . . . would be prohibited if the reward were
to be so limited‖).
83. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 83 (explaining that the Court did not outline a
formal legal test, or whether the tort applied to content other than news, or how much harm
was needed for a successful claim).
84. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). Judge Hand
also stated:
While it is of course true that law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases
where the occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is decided.

general common law in diversity jurisdiction cases, on which INS was
based, was abolished twenty years after the Court‘s decision.85 Since then,
INS has survived only where it has been adopted as state common law.86
Despite Judge Hand‘s concerns and the precedential limits placed on
INS, the Court‘s holding was expanded under state common law far beyond
the narrow circumstances of the original case—particularly to situations
involving new technologies not addressed by copyright law where some
form of unfair competition occurred. For example, in the 1938 case
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co.,87 the owners of the
Pittsburgh Pirates had an arrangement in which local NBC radio affiliates
paid a fee for the exclusive right to broadcast the baseball team‘s games. 88
But another station, KQV, announced its intention to broadcast its own
play-by-play reports by stationing reporters at certain locations outside the
stadium.89 The Pirates sued, fearing that KQV‘s actions undermined the
team‘s arrangement with the other stations.90 A federal court, relying
heavily on INS, ruled for the Pirates, holding that KQV‘s actions interfered
with the team‘s ―normal and legitimate business‖ and prevented the team
from benefitting from its labor and expenditures in the games.91
In 1950, INS‘ reach expanded even further when a New York state court
held in Metropolitan Opera Ass‟n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.92 that
direct competition—a key aspect of the INS decision—was no longer a
necessary element.93 The court concluded that ―persons in theoretically
non-competitive fields may, by unethical business practices, inflict as
severe and reprehensible injuries upon others as can direct competitors.‖94

[INS] appears to us such an instance . . . . The difficulties of understanding it
otherwise are insuperable.
Id.

85. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that ―[t]here is no
federal general common law‖ and that, except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution
or by acts of Congress, federal courts must abide by the law of the state in which the case
arose); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (explaining that the holding in
Erie was at least partly in response to forum-shopping, in which the parties choose a venue
most likely to provide a favorable judgment).
86. See supra note 24 (indicating that only five states have adopted hot news
misappropriation).
87. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938). The case involved Pennsylvania common law,
but was heard in district court because of the parties‘ diversity of citizenship and the amount
in controversy. Id. at 493.
88. Id. at 492.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 492–94.
92. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
93. Id. at 491–92.
94. Id. at 492.

2.

Hot news and federal preemption
Decades after INS was decided, the case‘s broad applicability was
significantly reduced. With the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress made it
easier to protect emerging technologies so that INS-like protections were no
longer needed.95 More significantly, the Copyright Act included a
provision preempting all common or state law protections that: (1) cover
works ―that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression,‖ (2) cover
subject matter specifically defined by federal copyright law, and (3) create
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the ―general scope‖ of copyright law.96
Since then, misappropriation cases loosely based on INS have typically
not been recognized by the courts.97 However, some courts, particularly
the Second Circuit, continue to find that narrow INS-like claims remain
viable.98 Until recently, though, there was much uncertainty about what
elements were necessary to bring a successful claim.99 Finally, in 1997, the
Second Circuit addressed much of the confusion about hot news
misappropriation in National Basketball Ass‟n v. Motorola, Inc.100—a case
in which the NBA filed a hot news claim against Motorola for the
unauthorized transmission of the league‘s scores and other real-time data
about games in progress to handheld pagers.101 The Court held that to
survive preemption, the following five elements must be met:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant‘s use of the information

95. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (permitting copyright protections for original works of
authorship ―now known or later developed‖) (emphasis added).
96. Id. at § 301(a).
97. See, e.g., Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters., 395 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901
(D.S.D. 2005) (holding that a pizza franchisee‘s misappropriation claim against a franchisor
over an advertising slogan was preempted by federal copyright law); Travel Bug Ltd. v.
Muscarello, No. 84 C 5467, 1986 WL 6941, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1986) (ruling against a
claim of misappropriation involving the alleged copying of a travel agency academy‘s
policy manual because the claim was preempted by copyright law); Mitchell v.
Penton/Indus. Publ‘g Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (dismissing claim that
defendant misappropriated certain information in plaintiff‘s book because such a claim was
preempted by copyright law).
98. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)
(establishing the five elements that must be met for a state claim of hot news
misappropriation to survive); see also X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that California‘s cause of action for hot news misappropriation
should not be preempted based on the Second Circuit‘s reasoning in Motorola); Fred
Wehrenberg
Circuit
of
Theatres,
Inc.
v.
Moviefone,
Inc.,
73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (asserting that Missouri would likely allow a
cause of action under a narrow application of hot news misappropriation).
99. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 117 (explaining that INS indicated that labor and
investment, time, free-riding, competition, and harm are all elements of hot news
misappropriation, but noting that the Court did not outline these elements as a legal test or
explain whether all needed to be met).
100. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
101. Id. at 843.

constitutes free riding on the plaintiff‘s efforts; (iv) the defendant is in
direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and
(v) the ability of the other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the
plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product
or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
102
threatened.

The Second Circuit ultimately ruled against the NBA, holding that only
some of these elements existed.103 The information was time-sensitive and
the league did provide a similar service to Motorola‘s, known as
Gamestats.104 However, the court ruled that Motorola‘s paging system was
not in direct competition with the NBA‘s primary business of producing
basketball games and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games.105
The court also held that there was no evidence that Motorola had engaged
in free-riding on the league‘s collection of factual material about the
games, such as scores and statistics, because Motorola used its own
resources to collect that information.106 However, the court explained that
free-riding would exist if Motorola were to collect facts directly from the
NBA‘s Gamestats and retransmit the data to its own pagers, and that such
free-riding could threaten the viability of Gamestats due to a lower-cost
competitor.107
Despite the guidance provided by Motorola, only eight cases have
specifically addressed the five-part test in the past thirteen years.108 And,
putting preemption concerns aside, critics question whether hot news
misappropriation is even feasible.109 They argue that INS-like scenarios no
longer exist because in today‘s media environment many stories build off
each other and no one is simply breaking news that others steal or
rewrite.110 As one commentator asserted, in the Internet age ―a true scoop
lasts for about a minute.‖111
102. Id. at 845.
103. Id. at 854.
104. Id. at 853.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 854 (explaining further that Motorola also used its own network to
transmit the information).
107. See id. (holding that in this case, such free-riding was not occurring because
Motorola‘s Gamestats was fairly competing with the NBA‘s SportsTrax in the marketplace).
108. The Second Circuit‘s decision in Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, was Keycited through
Sept. 11, 2010.
109. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621,
625 (2003) (declaring that freeriding is ―too broad to serve as a guiding principle of the law‖ because it encompasses
acceptable competition); David Blau, This Just In: “Hot News” Law Is Yesterday‟s News,
SUNSTEIN KANN MURPHY & TIMBERS LLP (March 2009),
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/publications-news/news-letters/2009/03/200903hotNews.html
(asserting that the doctrine‘s time has passed because the economics of the news business
have changed since INS was decided).
110. See Jeff Jarvis, There is No Hot News. All News is Hot News., BUZZ MACHINE
(June 28, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://www.buzzmachine.com/2010/06/28/there-is-no-hot-

Yet media organizations have increasingly turned to the doctrine as they
seek to protect their content from free-riders.112 In Associated Press v. All
Headline News Corp.,113 New York district court Judge
P. Kevin Castel ruled in 2009 that AP had a viable claim when it sued an
Internet-based news service that was allegedly distributing AP content
under its own name.114 Although the suit was eventually settled out of
court, the decision marked the first time a hot news claim was found viable
in the Internet age and signaled the continued relevance of the doctrine.115
The same district court gave hot news misappropriation another boost in
March when three Wall Street banks successfully sued
Theflyonthewall.com (―Fly‖) for hot news misappropriation, claiming the
financial website took the firms‘ investment research without authorization
and redistributed the recommendations before the firms had a chance to
share it with their clients.116
In Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com,117 district court judge Denise Cote ruled in favor of
the firms after finding that all five elements established in Motorola were
met.118 The judge first stated that Fly did not dispute that the banks
incurred significant expense coming up with recommendations to help their
clients maximize returns on investments.119 Second, the judge determined
that the recommendations were clearly time-sensitive because the clients
used the information to make trades in anticipation of stock price

news-all-news-is-hot-news/ (arguing that the idea of hot news should be ―repellant‖ to
journalists because the restrictions would limit all efforts to disseminate information freely).
See generally Nate Anderson, Who Owns the Facts? The AP and the “Hot News”
Controversy, ARS TECHNICA (May 6, 2009, 11:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/05/who-owns-the-facts-the-ap-and-the-hot-news-controversy.ars (stating
that unlike the early ―hot news‖ cases, today‘s process of newsgathering is ―mixed, blended,
[and] messy‖).
111. Erick Schonfeld, Hot News: The AP is Living in the Last Century, TECHCRUNCH
(Feb. 22, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/02/22/hot-news-the-ap-is-living-in-the-lastcentury/.
112. See, e.g., Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457–
58 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (involving AP‘s claims against an Internet-based news service for
copying AP stories from websites and reselling the content); Dow Jones Complaint, supra
note 16, ¶ 2–3, 7 (alleging that a website was routinely copying Dow Jones‘s stories and
headlines).
113. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
114. See id. at 461 (stating that the hot news doctrine remains viable under New York
law and that the defendants did not persuasively argue why the five-factor test in Motorola
should be rejected).
115. See generally Blau, supra note 109 (asserting that the real story of Associated Press
v. All Headline News Corp. is the ―possible revival‖ of the hot news doctrine and arguing
that its granting of a ―quasi-property‖ right to news is problematic).
116. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
117. 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
118. See id. at 335–42, 348 (analyzing each of the five factors in the Motorola test and
ordering an injunction of Fly‘s copyright and misappropriation activities).
119. See id. at 335 (stating that the banks employ hundreds of analysts and spend
millions annually on producing the reports).

movement.120 Third, Fly engaged in free-riding by making no investment
of its own in equity research.121 Fourth, the banks and Fly were in direct
competition because disseminating the recommendations was Fly‘s primary
business and producing such reports was among the banks‘ primary
businesses.122 The banks and Fly also distributed the recommendations in a
similar fashion.123 Finally, the judge held that the banks‘ economic
incentive to produce the recommendations was substantially threatened
because, although the banks presented no statistical evidence, ―common
sense and the circumstantial evidence about the plaintiffs‘ business model
make the [banks‘] contentions about its reduced incentives utterly
credible.‖124 The judge also set a specific time limit on how long the facts
in question had value,125 preventing Fly from publishing pre-market
research until thirty minutes after the stock market opens.126 Fly was also
ordered to wait two hours to publish research issued while the market is
open.127
In May, however, the Second Circuit set aside the injunction pending an
appeal by Fly.128 If the ruling survives, one commentator asserts that
Theflyonthewall.com could be welcome news for traditional media
organizations and bad news for aggregators because the district court‘s
decision was detailed, thoroughly reasoned, and ―the product of a fullblown trial, giving it a concreteness and specificity that other, Internetrelated hot news decisions . . . lack.‖129
C. Hot News, Intellectual Property, and the First Amendment
Aside from preemption concerns, the First Amendment has been
described as the ―elephant in the room‖ when it comes to hot news
120. See id. at 336 (noting that the banks engaged in a ―frenzied process‖ to be first to
inform their clients).
121. Id. at 336–37 (explaining that although Fly attributed the information to the banks,
such attribution only underscored Fly‘s free-riding because it was the banks‘ backing that
gave the recommendations any perceived value).
122. Id. at 339.
123. Id. at 339–40 (noting that the parties use ―similar, and in some instances identical,
channels of distribution‖).
124. Id. at 342.
125. See id. at 345–46 (stating that ―the goal is a period of lead time long enough to
enable the Firms to conduct a reasonable sales effort and to retain the advantage of being the
first to reach key institutional investors who may react promptly to a Firm‘s
Recommendation‖).
126. Id. at 347.
127. Id.
128. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-1372-cv (2d Cir. May 19, 2010) (granting an expedited
appeal).
129. Sam Bayard, Barclays v. Theflyonthewall.com: Hot News Doctrine Alive and
Kicking; Will News Aggregators Be Next?, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, Mar. 23, 2010,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/barclays-v-theflyonthewallcom-hot-news-doctrinealive-and-kicking-will-news-aggregators-be.

misappropriation.130 This issue has gone unaddressed by the Supreme
Court since the doctrine‘s beginnings.
In establishing hot news
misappropriation in INS, the Court never discussed how a doctrine that
restricts others from using facts in the public domain could co-exist with
the First Amendment,131 which declares that ―Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.‖132 Justice Louis Brandeis‘
dissent in INS came closest: ―The general rule of law is, that the noblest of
human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and
ideas—become after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to
common use.‖133
In the more than ninety years since INS, First Amendment case law has
developed more fully. In particular, the Supreme Court has established that
prior restraints—official restrictions of speech before publication—are the
most serious infringement of free speech.134 Since 1931, the Court has
consistently
found
that
such
attempts
to censor information are presumed unconstitutional.135 In the landmark
case of Nebraska Press Ass‟n v. Stuart,136 for instance, the Court noted that
―[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‗heavy
presumption‘ against its constitutional validity,‖137 and that this burden is
not diminished merely because the restraint is temporary.138 ―The
damage,‖ the Court asserted, ―can be particularly great when the prior
restraint falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current

130. See Brief Amici Curiae of Citizen Media Law Project et al. in Support of Neither
Party at 6, Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2d Cir. June
24, 2010) (urging the Second Circuit to recognize the First Amendment implications of hot
news when ruling on the Flyonthewall.com appeal).
131. Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (discussing copyright,
property, unfair competition but not the First Amendment).
132. U.S. CONST. amend I.
133. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). One commentator
suggests that the Supreme Court never bothered addressing whether hot news can sustain a
First Amendment challenge because cases invoking the doctrine had largely disappeared
from the courts. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1070 (2000).
134. See Neb. Press Ass‘n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541, 559 (1976) (denouncing prior
restraint in the context of a state judge‘s order restricting the publishing of a murder
suspect‘s possible admissions and calling prior restraint ―the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights‖).
135. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (holding that the
primary purpose of constitutional protections for the press is preventing previous restraints
on publication); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) (stating that ―the Government ‗thus carries a heavy burden‘‖ to justify the
imposition of a prior restraint (citation omitted)); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963) (―Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.‖).
136. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
137. Id. at 558 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 559.

events.‖139 The presumption against prior restraints is so significant, the
Court continued, because such actions freeze speech—at least for a limited
time.140 Even in instances where damages are sought after publication, like
in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,141 the Court emphasized that the
First Amendment protects the publication of truthful information on
matters of public interest, provided such information is lawfully obtained,
and ―absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.‖142
While First Amendment protections have grown more robust since INS,
the Court has also recognized that the right to free speech has important
limitations when intellectual property rights are involved.143 The Court
emphasized this point in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,144
a case involving the common law ―right to publicity‖ doctrine, which
prohibits the appropriation of a private citizen‘s name or likeness for
commercial benefit.145 In Zacchini, a ―human cannonball‖ performer sued
a television broadcasting company for broadcasting his entire act on
television, claiming that the broadcast ―was an appropriation of his
professional property.‖146 In ruling for the performer, the Court held that
the First Amendment does not ―immunize‖ a media organization that
broadcasts an entire performance without the performer‘s consent.147 The
Court explained that the protection granted by the right of publicity
provided the performer with an ―economic incentive‖ to produce a
performance of public interest.148 ―This same consideration,‖ the court
added, ―underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this
Court.‖149
Indeed, eight years later in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, the Court explained why defendants in copyright cases, where
preliminary injunctions are frequently granted,150 also were not shielded by
the First Amendment. In language closely mirroring Zacchini, the Court

139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. (―If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publications
‗chills‘ speech, prior restraint ‗freezes‘ it at least for the time.‖).
141. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
142. Id. at 103.
143. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the First Amendment does not give citizens the right ―to commit
perjury, to libel other citizens, to infringe copyrights, to incite riots, or to interfere unduly
with passage through a public thoroughfare‖).
144. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
145. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 13–14, (8th ed. 2010) (explaining the
history and policy reasons for granting a ―right of publicity‖).
146. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562, 569.
147. Id. at 575.
148. Id. at 576.
149. Id.
150. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 150 (1998) (asserting that in copyright cases,
preliminary injunctions are granted as a matter of course).

stated that copyright is ―the engine of free expression‖ because it provides
an economic incentive for the creation and dissemination of ideas that
benefit the public.151 The Court emphasized that copyright protections and
the First Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech were not in conflict
because copyright merely protects expression, not facts and ideas.152 The
Court also went on to stress that copyright should not be used ―as an
instrument to suppress facts.‖153
The Supreme Court has not provided a similar analysis involving hot
news misappropriation and the First Amendment. However, a U.S. district
court in New York addressed the issue in an early version of the Motorola
case,154 which was eventually appealed to the Second Circuit.155 The
defendant argued that granting the NBA injunctive relief on its hot news
misappropriation claim would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.156 The
district court rejected this argument,157 citing a Supreme Court decision
that concluded that not all injunctions that affect expression rise to the level
of a prior restraint.158 Based on the Court‘s reasoning in Madsen v.
Women‟s Health Center,159 the district court explained that an injunction
was not an unconstitutional prior restraint if: (1) the justification for the
injunction was content neutral (in other words, the injunction was not used
to favor or suppress a particular point of view)160 and (2) the injunction did
not permanently bar expression.161
151. Harper, 471 U.S. at 558.
152. See id. at 556 (―[C]opyright‘s idea/expression dichotomy ‗strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author‘s expression.‘‖ (citation omitted)).
For a more detailed explanation of copyright law and the facts, see supra notes 34–52 and
accompanying text.
153. Harper, 471 U.S. at 559.
154. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939
F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff‟d in part and vacated in part, Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v.
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997).
155. The Second Circuit did not address the parties‘ First Amendment arguments after
finding that the plaintiff‘s hot news misappropriation claim failed. Motorola, 105 F.3d at
854.
For a more thorough discussion of the Second Circuit‘s ruling,
see supra text accompanying notes 100–107.
156. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1086.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1087; see Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994) (holding
that an injunction keeping protesters thirty-six feet from an abortion clinic did not violate
the First Amendment).
159. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
160. For example, the Supreme Court held that a noise ordinance targeting a
performance venue in New York City did not violate the First Amendment because the
ordinance was aimed at preserving a quiet area for recreational activities like walking and
reading, not because of any disagreement with a particular message that the noise conveyed.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (explaining that the city was
concerned with the volume of sound, not the value of particular performers emitting the
sound). Because content-neutral restrictions do not target the content of speech, such
restrictions are not usually considered censorship and the Court sometimes applies
intermediate scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 52 (1987) (noting that when applying intermediate

In applying the two-part test, the district court quickly concluded that
granting injunctive relief for the NBA‘s hot news claim did not violate the
First Amendment. For the first element, the court explained that preventing
the defendant from commercially misappropriating the NBA‘s proprietary
rights by transmitting the league‘s scores and other data was a contentneutral speech restriction.162 The court next held that the defendant was not
―totally thwarted‖ in its efforts to use data from NBA games; the defendant
simply could not do so in the unlawful manner chosen.163
II. COPYRIGHT‘S INABILITY TO PROTECT FACTS LEAVES A CRITICAL GAP
IN THE LAW THAT HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION SHOULD FILL
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Feist discussed in Part I demonstrates
that the Court is unwilling to protect facts when applying copyright law.164
Copyright therefore does little to prevent free-riders from profiting off
original reporting, which this Comment will demonstrate by applying
Feist‘s
two-part
analysis
to
a
famous
news story.165 Yet there is a readily available solution: hot news
misappropriation.166 The Court left open the possibility of protecting facts
outside copyright law when it stated in Feist that, in certain circumstances,
protecting ―the fruits of such research‖ might be possible.167 Although hot
news misappropriation is now only recognized in a handful of states, this
Comment will also explain why more courts should adopt the doctrine,
provided that certain elements are readily met.168
A. Copyright Law is Unable to Protect Significant Portions of News
Stories from Free-Riding
Under the two-part test articulated in Feist, copyright law is woefully
ineffective at protecting news stories from free-riders. According to Feist,

scrutiny to content-neutral restrictions, the Court considers the substantiality of the
governmental interest and the availability of less restrictive alternatives).
161. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1087. In articulating this two-part test, the
district court cited Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359, 368 n.5 (2d Cir. 1994)
(interpreting Madsen), vacated in part on other grounds, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff‟d in part and rev‟d in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
162. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1087.
163. Id.
164. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Court‘s rejection of ―sweat of the brow‖ and the
justification for that rejection).
165. See infra Part II.A (showing how the two-part test limits a news organization‘s
ability to protect the work that goes into lengthy investigative reporting, such as the
Watergate scandal).
166. See supra Part I.B (explaining the history and evolution of the hot news doctrine
from INS to the present day).
167. Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).
168. See infra Part II.B (recommending the various elements that should be met for a
valid claim of hot news misappropriation).

infringement occurs only when: (1) the author of the work holds a valid
copyright, and (2) the elements of the work that are copied are original.169
To illustrate how this test applies to original reporting, consider just one
example of the famous investigative reporting by Washington Post
reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward during the Watergate scandal
that led to President Nixon‘s resignation.170
On October 17, 1972, the Post reported that Nixon‘s re-election
committee was engaged in a massive spying campaign aimed at
discrediting Democratic challengers, and that the Watergate break-in was
tied to this effort.171 The carefully reported 2900-word story cited law
enforcement sources, FBI and Justice Department files, and quoted a White
House spokesman and several other officials.172
Under the first element of the Feist test, the Post‘s story as a whole is
protectable by copyright because it involves original expression, such as
how Woodward and Bernstein arranged the facts detailing the spying
campaign and the specific language used to articulate those facts.173 Thus,
a competitor could not simply cut and paste or closely paraphrase the entire
story onto a competing website (had such sites existed thirty years ago, of
course).174 However, as the Court stated in Feist, protection for ―a factual
compilation is thin.‖175 Under Feist‟s second prong, others remain free to
take the facts that make up the story—in other words, they can write about
the spying campaign and the players involved—as long as those facts are
not presented in the same language.176 Thus, a free-rider could get around
the second element in Feist by simply rewriting and rearranging the Post‘s
story, thereby avoiding any duplication of the reporters‘ original
expression.177

169. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
170. Nixon resigned in 1974, but the Post first reported on the Watergate break-in two
years earlier. See, e.g., CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT‘S MEN 13
(1974) (describing that the tip for the Watergate break-in occurred on a Saturday in June of
1972).
171. See Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged
Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1972, at A1 (describing in considerable detail the actions
that Nixon campaign aides took to undermine Democratic candidates, such as leaking made
up information to the press).
172. Id.
173. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 (explaining that while facts are not copyrightable,
compilations of facts typically are protected); see also Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that copyright protects ―the
author‘s analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments‖).
174. See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (articulating the notion that
while individual facts can be used, copyright can come into play when they are incorporated
into a larger work).
175. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d
Cir. 1999) (holding that there was no copyright violation by the defendant when the facts

In the Internet era, it is easy to see how painstaking hours of research
that went into Woodward and Bernstein‘s reporting could be rewritten,
posted, and then used by free-riders in near real time, leaving the Post with
little opportunity to exploit the advantage of being first. As Associated
Press v. All Headline News Corp. demonstrates, the business model for
aggregators seeking to free-ride on news organizations while avoiding
copyright infringement is clear: first, hire poorly paid writers to find
breaking news stories on the Internet; second, have the writers pull out the
facts and then rewrite the information; finally, turn around and sell the
stories to others while marketing the product as your own.178 A prominent
media attorney who represented the Associated Press against All Headline
News acknowledged that an aggregator who pursues such a strategy is
likely to defeat a news organization‘s argument of copyright
infringement.179
Even if a news organization can demonstrate that a free-rider copied
expression, copyright law provides another hurdle that a successful claim
must overcome: fair use. Faced with such a lawsuit, a free-rider would
almost certainly argue that at least a portion of the copying, such as
headlines and other brief snippets, was protected under the fair use
doctrine.180 As discussed in Part I.A, the federal Copyright Act specifically
states that fair use of a copyrighted work for news reporting is not
infringement.181 Yet no controlling precedent exists specifically involving
aggregators and fair use, making it difficult to determine whether a fair use
defense would ultimately succeed.182
News organizations can take some solace in Harper, where the Court
ruled there was no fair use when The Nation directly copied portions of a
leaked manuscript, at least in part because of The Nation‟s commercial use
of the work.183 Since many news free-riders stand to profit financially,184

were presented ―in a different arrangement, with a different sentence structure and different
phrasing‖).
178. 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
179. See Andrew L. Deutsch, Protecting News in the Digital Era: The Case for a
Federalized Hot News Misappropriation Tort, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW
2010, 511, 514 (2010) (commenting that free-riders compete with original news gatherers
because they provide a cheap alternative for news content).
180. See id. at 525 (asserting that an aggregator would ―certainly seek dismissal‖ of the
case on fair use grounds).
181. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (detailing what types of use are
considered fair use under the Copyright Act).
182. See generally FTC Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 19, at 7–8 (stating that there
are many views as to whether aggregators fall within the fair use exception and that a ―quick
. . . resolution is unlikely‖).
183. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
184. See generally supra text accompanying notes 8–15 (discussing how aggregators are
able to undersell traditional newspapers in online advertising).

Harper seems to indicate that a fair use argument would fail.185 However,
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.,186 a fair use ruling nine years after
Harper that did not involve news reporting,187 the Court made it clear that
commercial use does not automatically disqualify a work from fair use.188
Instead, the Court stated, ―the more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.‖189
Transformative works, according to the Court, ―add[] something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.‖190 One commentator suggests that at
least one type of free-riding—search engines, which republish the headline
and initial paragraphs of a news story—might be transformative by
providing a reference tool for users to seek out myriad stories on a
particular subject.191
Regardless of whether such an argument is
successful, fair use is another wrinkle in copyright law that threatens to
undermine attempts to protect original journalism.
These concerns underscore a significant problem with copyright law
post-Feist, which is the lack of incentive for authors to create fact-based
works involving little creative expression. If news organizations stop
investing resources to cover major stories, such as Watergate, it would
undermine one of the key goals of copyright: promoting the broad
availability of new works.192 Legal commentators suggest that the Feist
Court might have appreciated the value of protecting facts under the ―sweat
of the brow‖ theory if Feist had involved the struggles of news
organizations rather than a low-stakes case that involved alphabetical
listings
in
a
rural
Kansas
phone
book.193
185. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 562 (asserting that commercial use ―is presumptively an
unfair exploitation‖ of copyrighted material (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))).
186. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
187. Instead, the case involved the musical group 2 Live Crew, which was accused of
violating the copyright of the song ―Oh Pretty Woman‖ after parodying it. Id. at 571–72.
188. See id. at 572 (announcing that a work‘s ―commercial character is only one element
to be weighed in a fair use enquiry‖).
189. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Deutsch, supra note 179, at 531–32. For support, Deutsch cites to Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir.), amended on reh‟g by, 508 F.3d 1146
(9th Cir. 2007), in which the Ninth Circuit held that Google‘s use of thumbnail images of
copyrighted works was ―highly transformative‖ and thus likely fair use. However, no other
circuit has adopted this ruling.
192. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 349 (1992) (noting that
granting authors exclusive rights to their works was ―thought to encourage production,‖
thereby benefitting society).
193. See generally Sanford et al., supra note 24, at 8 (stating that Feist shows that ―bad
facts make bad law‖ and that the facts in Feist are ―comically out of step with the realities of
publishing today‖).

Yet, these commentators note, ―the trouble with Feist as the high noon
moment for the ‗sweat of the brow‘ theory is that there just wasn‘t much
sweat to speak of.‖194 Unfortunately, any attempt to amend copyright law
post-Feist to protect facts is unlikely because the Court rooted its decision
in the Constitution.195 A clear alternative is needed.
B. A Narrow Application of Hot News Misappropriation Should Fill the
Void Left by Copyright
Because copyright law fails to adequately protect original news content
from free-riders, more courts should allow plaintiffs to invoke narrow, INSlike hot news misappropriation claims. Applying a slight variation of the
five-part test established by the Second Circuit in Motorola is a critical
starting point.196 However, those elements are not enough; courts should
take two additional steps as part of an expanded legal framework that is
intended to minimize First Amendment concerns and further ensure that
successful claims closely conform with INS.197 This Comment will refer to
the expanded test as ―Motorola plus.‖
To determine whether a claim survives preemption, courts should first
turn to the Motorola analysis,198 with a slight change to the fifth element:199
(1) the plaintiff generates information at a cost, (2) the information is timesensitive, (3) the defendant‘s use of the information constitutes free-riding,
(4) the defendant‘s product or service is in direct competition with the
plaintiff‘s product or service, and (5) the defendant‘s free-riding is likely to
reduce the plaintiff‘s incentive to produce the product or service, thereby
threatening its existence.200 As the Second Circuit plainly stated in
Motorola, elements two, three, and five distinguish hot news claims from
those involving copyright infringement, thus allowing the doctrine to
survive preemption.201 This Comment will discuss preemption in more
detail in Part III.A.

194. Id.
195. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(―It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler‘s labor may be used by others
without compensation. . . . [H]owever, this is not some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme. It is, rather, the essence of copyright and a constitutional requirement.‖(internal
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 198–204 (laying out the five-part test and
explaining why changes were made to the fifth element).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 208–218 (explaining the two extra elements and
why they are needed).
198. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)
(establishing five elements that the court asserts must be met for an INS-like claim to
survive federal preemption).
199. See generally infra text accompanying notes 201–204 (explaining the reason for the
change in wording from Motorola).
200. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 845.
201. Id. at 853.

The wording of the fifth element has been altered slightly from Motorola
to make it clear that the plaintiff is not required to show statistical proof
that its business has already been damaged, similar to the facts in INS.202
Rather, a court should be able to infer that such damage would likely occur
if the defendant‘s free-riding continued.203 This ensures that the doctrine is
applied by the courts before extensive economic damage is inflicted on the
plaintiff, at which point accurate monetary damages might be difficult—if
not impossible—to calculate, and the court would be forced to speculate.204
Besides fortifying hot news misappropriation from preemption concerns,
the fourth and fifth elements of the Motorola test play an important public
policy role by ensuring that successful claims are limited to instances of
systematic copying that substantially harm the plaintiff. This should ease
fears that news organizations will use hot news misappropriation to target
individuals who post occasional news headlines and blurbs on social
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter—claims that could become so
numerous as to be impractical for courts to handle given the minor
damages likely to be at stake.205 Indeed, without evidence of systematic
copying, a plaintiff will be hard-pressed to show that occasional copying
threatens its existence, as required by element five.206 And the direct
competition requirement in element four eliminates claims where the
alleged harm is insignificant, such as when the defendant is not competing
with the plaintiff for the same revenue or market share.207
202. See Int‟l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 230 (1918) (discussing the
considerable cost AP incurred in gathering the news but failing to address the specific
financial harm suffered by the wire service as a result of INS‘ free-riding);
see also Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (rejecting defendant‘s attempt to require the plaintiffs to show actual damages).
203. In INS, the Court did not require direct proof that AP had been harmed in order to
rule in its favor. See Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241 (noting the ―obvious results‖ of INS‘
actions toward AP).
204. See generally Which Kind of Damages Are Available in IP Disputes?, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/faq/judiciary/faq08.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011) (explaining that establishing the true extent of infringement for
purposes of calculating damages in intellectual property cases is ―notoriously difficult,‖
especially if the infringement occurs online).
205. See Brief for Amici Curiae Google, Inc. & Twitter, Inc. in Support of Reversal at
12, Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., No. 10-1372-cv (2nd Cir. June 21,
2010) (asserting that it would be impossible to restrict the dissemination of news in a world
of citizen journalists).
206. Systematic copying was a key element in the first hot news misappropriation case.
See Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231 (detailing that INS repeatedly misappropriated AP‘s
stories by taking numerous articles off bulletin boards or from early-edition newspapers that
included AP content). Systematic copying also occurred in a recent, successful hot news
misappropriation case. See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 342–43 (explaining
that Theflyonthewall.com frequently misappropriated and reported the banks‘ research
recommendations).
207. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997)
(defeating a hot news claim because the NBA, which primarily produces live basketball
games, did not directly compete with the defendant, which sold and marketed a pager
featuring sports data).

If all five elements in Motorola are satisfied, courts should next inquire
whether protecting the plaintiff‘s information will provide a tangible,
useful benefit to society.208 After all, the primary goal of protecting
intellectual property under the commonly used utilitarian theory is not to
reward the author; instead, the goal is to provide authors with adequate
economic incentive to create new works that promote ―the [p]rogress of
Science and useful Arts.‖209 As this Comment will discuss more
thoroughly in Part III.B, these goals mirror those of the First
Amendment.210 If authors do not have adequate economic incentive to
create useful works, then fewer such works will be created and one of the
amendment‘s key objectives—promoting the exchange of ideas—will be
lessened.211 While ensuring the survival of original news reporting, which
keeps the citizenry informed, clearly meets this additional standard,212 other
fact-based works outside the scope of this Comment might also pass this
test.213 Ultimately, the courts have wide discretion in determining what is
useful and thus deserving of hot news protection.
Next, the plaintiff should be required to show that it had the information
first. As the Supreme Court stated in INS, the value of news depends
―chiefly upon its novelty and freshness.‖214 Thus, if the plaintiff is not first
with the information, the work‘s societal value may be diminished to the
point where the benefits of providing protection no longer outweigh the
costs.215 The element of ―firstness‖ also should help courts weed out
claims for which there is no effective remedy. Consider, for example,
situations in which myriad organizations are covering a breaking news
story such as a natural disaster, when news unfolds rapidly and information
208. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 355 (1999)
(insisting that any departure from the idea that communicated information is free be
―specifically justified‖).
209. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (emphasizing the role copyright plays in promoting
the progress of science and useful arts); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975) (concluding that while motivating the author is important, copyright‘s
ultimate goal is to ―stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good‖).
210. See infra text accompanying notes 260–266. The Motorola court did not address
the First Amendment after determining that the plaintiff‘s claim was preempted by the fivepart test. See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 854 n.10 (relegating to a footnote the statement that
there was no need to address the defendant‘s free speech concerns).
211. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
212. See FTC Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 19, at 5 (illustrating how reporting can
improve society by providing an example of how investigative reporting can bring about
reforms at a local hospital, which in turn can lead to better health care).
213. See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 343
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that banks‘ equity research plays an important role in pricing
stocks fairly, thereby helping to ensure an efficient allocation of capital).
214. Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238 (1918).
215. Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14 (2003) (explaining that if a good is not scarce and has no
exchange value, then ―the social value of property rights will be slight or even negative‖).

that is valuable one moment is stale the next.216 In these instances,
establishing a limited property right in the news has little practical value—a
point AP itself made in its brief to the Supreme Court in INS.217 In many
other circumstances, however, firstness will be clearly discernable—such
as when a news organization is first to report a story after an investigation
or when the organization has the only reporter covering an event in a
remote region.218
Besides meeting these seven requirements, the plaintiff must overcome
several key defenses by an alleged hot news infringer. The plaintiff must
show that it not only broke the news, but that the copying outlet did not
independently report the story on its own.219 Additionally, courts should
allow defendants to defeat a plaintiff‘s hot news claim if the defendant
shows that the information was used for commentary or criticism of news
reporting, similar to some of the fair use protections under copyright law.220
If all these elements are met, the plaintiff‘s remedy should be injunctive
relief that lasts only until the commercial value of the news has ―passed
away.‖221 As addressed by element five of the Motorola test, a monetary
remedy is unworkable because it would place courts in the awkward
position of speculating on the exact impact of the unauthorized copying.222
Injunctive relief also has an obvious shortcoming: it cannot reverse the
harm caused by unauthorized copying that has already occurred. However,
injunctions will allow news organizations to halt the systematic free-riding
of valuable content that, if unchecked, could bring about the industry‘s
demise.223
216. Cf. Jarvis, supra note 110 (quoting the head of Thomson Reuters, who stated that
his news is valuable for mere ―milliseconds‖).
217. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 73 (―If conditions of the world were such that
every happening anywhere became automatically known to everybody everywhere, there
could hardly be any property value in news; but as the world actually is, a great organization
of vigilance, investigation, transmission and distribution is necessary to connect the fact
with those who wish to know it.‖ (quoting Brief for Respondent, at 11–12, INS)).
218. The Washington Post‘s coverage of Watergate is one example. See supra text
accompanying notes 170–172 (describing how the Post spent two years investigating
aspects of the Watergate break-in).
219. Cf. Schonfeld, supra note 111 (arguing that for INS to be valid today AP would
have to demonstrate evidence of news stories in which its journalists broke the news and
where it was the only news organization to do so).
220. See Deutsch, supra note 179, at 588 (urging the adoption of a similar defense while
outlining a proposal for a federal hot news tort).
221. See Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245–46 (1918) (declining to
specify a specific injunction against INS and instead directing the lower court ―to deal with
the matter upon appropriate application made to it for the purpose‖).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 202–204.
223. Because hot news misappropriation deals with systematic copying, injunctive relief
also should not prompt a rush to the courthouse every time unauthorized copying occurs, an
issue that was not addressed by INS nor the most recent court that considered injunctive
relief involving hot news misappropriation. See Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245–46
(discussing only the amount of time an injunction should last, and even then avoiding
prescribing any specific time limit); Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F.

The Court in INS did not provide any specific guidance about the length
of time an injunction should last,224 and this Comment sees no need to
prescribe an exact time limit either. Instead, the courts should provide the
plaintiff with just enough lead time necessary to ensure continued
investment in newsgathering.225 Normally, the originator of valuable
information has an opportunity to exploit the natural lead time of being
first.226 The instantaneousness of the Internet, however, all but eliminates
this advantage because information is copied and pasted almost instantly.227
While at least one commentator suggests that hot news protections last
twenty-four hours,228 such a rigid approach is unhelpful. Hot news
protections can expire sooner, depending on the facts of the case. For
example, in Theflyonthewall.com, a New York federal court prevented a
financial website from publishing some information until thirty minutes
after the stock market opened.229
Rather than leaving hot news misappropriation in the common law, some
commentators have suggested that Congress amend the Copyright Act to
include hot news protections230 or federalize the doctrine by passing a hot
news statute.231 Such an approach is unnecessary—at least for now. The

Supp. 2d 310, 346–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (prescribing only the amount of time the injunction
should last).
224. Int‟l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245–46.
225. See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 345–46 (stating that determining the
right amount of lead time is important so as to give the plaintiff enough incentive to create
the valued work without also giving the plaintiff an opportunity to ―squeeze every last cent
out of their efforts to the exclusion of others‖). See also T.B. MACAULAY, Copyright I.
(February 5, 1941), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY:
SPEECHES AND LEGAL STUDIES 235, 241 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1900) (stating in an 1841
speech on copyright before Britain‘s House of Commons that ―monopoly is an evil. For the
sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than
is necessary for the purpose of securing the good‖).
226. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995) (stating that
lead time typically allows the originator to recover the costs of gathering the valuable
information, thereby encouraging continued investment).
227. See Marburger, supra note 4 (explaining that due to the ease with which one can
repost material online, a reader can now find equally fresh news on both a newspaper‘s
official website and on a free-rider‘s website).
228. See Clay Calvert et al., All the News That‟s Fit to Own: Hot News on the Internet &
the Commodification of News in Digital Culture, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 28–
29 n.183 (2009–2010) (noting a suggested change to copyright law that would provide
journalists protection for the facts they uncover for a twenty-four hour period following
publication).
229. See Barclays Capital Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d at 347 (declining to provide injunctive
relief beyond the ―minimum level of protection necessary to ensure that a socially valuable
product is not driven out of the market through unfair competition‖).
230. See Holte, supra note 4 at 32–33 (suggesting that either the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act should be amended to include added protections or an entirely new section
should be added concerning news reporting).
231. See Deutsch, supra note 179, at 579–80 (arguing that leaving hot news to state
judges could lead to a variety of standards while a federalized doctrine would instead
streamline the process); Sanford & Brown, supra note 17, at A15 (arguing that the doctrine
should be federalized because it is only recognized in a handful of states).

rapid evolution of the Internet and digital communications means that
implementing legislation now could have unforeseen consequences,
difficult to undo as technology evolves. 232 Instead, the courts should take a
more measured approach, allowing hot news misappropriation cases to play
out within the ―Motorola plus‖ framework as new challenges unfold.
Although this framework is rigorous, a plaintiff faced with the systematic,
INS-like free-riding of its content—a growing problem in the Internet
age233—should find success.
III. WHY A NARROW APPLICATION OF HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION IS A
WORKABLE SOLUTION
The two major criticisms of hot news—that the doctrine is preempted by
federal copyright law and that it infringes on the First Amendment—are not
an issue under the ―Motorola-plus‖ framework. Some legal scholars argue
that all hot news misappropriation claims are preempted by the 1976
Copyright Act.234 However, this Comment argues that the wording of the
statute and congressional intent at the time the act was passed explicitly
carve out an exception for narrow INS-like claims.235 This Comment also
argues that hot news misappropriation preserves, rather than hinders, free
speech by providing an economic incentive for the creation of useful new
works.236 And, much like other intellectual property protections, such as
copyright, the courts can limit the doctrine‘s reach to alleviate these
concerns.237
A. Hot News Survives Preemption Because the Doctrine Does Not Cover
Copyrightable Subject Matter
Federal copyright law does not preempt hot news misappropriation if the
doctrine is carefully applied. Although legal scholars and the courts have

232. See EKSTRAND, supra note 70, at 163 (concluding that a poorly designed statute
could harm the public domain in ways that hot news currently does not).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 1–15 (illustrating the challenges that free-riding
poses to the news industry).
234. There are two schools of thought on state law with respect to intellectual property:
an expansive view and a minimalist view. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 145, at 947
(explaining that the expansive approach believes state law can fill gaps in protection under
federal law, while the minimalist approach views state laws more cautiously because of their
tendency to remove information from the public domain). Marburger, supra note 6,
provides an example of the minimalist approach by stating that there is no preemption
exception for the ruling in INS.
235. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 259–269.
237. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (limiting an injunction against a free-riding website to a two-hour period to
allow the originally reporting party adequate lead time).

varying viewpoints that fail to definitively resolve the issue,238 the language
of the Copyright Act provides a helpful starting point. As discussed in Part
I.B, state laws are preempted by copyright law only when they: (1) cover
works fixed in a tangible medium of expression, (2) cover subject matter
specifically defined by copyright law, and (3) create legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the ―general
scope‖ of the federal Copyright Act.239
The first and third elements are the most problematic for hot news
misappropriation. Because nearly all news stories transmit facts in the
form of words, sounds or pictures, the first preemption requirement will
almost always be met.240 The third preemption requirement is also easily
satisfied because hot news misappropriation, in allowing a court to issue an
injunction that prevents a competitor from using the same facts, provides
an equivalent remedy to the Copyright Act; both doctrines grant exclusivity
to one party at the expense of another for a limited time.241
However, there is little consistency among the courts‘ various
interpretations of the second element.242 Prior to Feist, when some courts
protected fact-based works to provide an incentive for their creation, the
argument that copyright law preempted hot news misappropriation was
stronger because facts, at least occasionally, came within the general
subject matter of copyright protection.243 In Feist, however, the Court
made it explicitly clear that copyright does not protect facts or ideas.244
This is so, the Court said, because ―facts do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship.‖245 The Court even went so far as to state that the Constitution
238. See supra note 234 (illustrating the diverging scholarly viewpoints on the issue).
Compare Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that there is no federal preemption), with Lowry‘s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason,
Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 756 (D. Md. 2003) (suggesting that hot news misappropriation
might be preempted by the Copyright Act in limited circumstances).
239. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
240. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (explaining that under the Copyright Act, the
form of fixation can mean ―words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphical
or symbolic indicia‖).
241. Compare Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918) (holding
that hot news misappropriation allows AP to prevent INS from copying its stories as long as
the news has value), with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (stating that a copyright holder has the exclusive
right to reproduce the protected work).
242. Contrary to the Second Circuit in Motorola, the Fifth Circuit has taken a strict
approach, finding preemption as long as the work falls within the broad confines of
copyright law. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a state software protection statute is preempted because it ―touches upon an
area‖ of federal copyright law).
243. See Jeweler‘s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 95 (2nd Cir. 1922)
(establishing the ―sweat of the brow‖ theory).
244. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991)
(―[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.‖).
245. Id. at 347. To be clear, compilations of facts are a different matter altogether. See
id. at 348 (explaining that in compiling facts, the author shows enough originality—by

required such a determination.246 Thus, Feist underscores a critical
distinction between hot news, which protects information, and copyright,
which protects expression. Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor‘s majority
opinion seems to acknowledge this distinction in a footnote addressing
what impact Feist had on INS.247 Rather than overrule INS, as the Court
could have done if copyright preempted hot news, O‘Connor instead wrote
that INS ―ultimately rendered judgment for Associated Press on
noncopyright grounds that are not relevant here.‖248
Additionally, the American Law Institute‘s formal commentary
accompanying the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition stopped just
short of suggesting there was no place for INS alongside the 1976
Copyright Act.249 Instead, the commentary urged against a broad
application of INS so as not to undermine the policy reasons behind
copyright law‘s limitations,250 yet acknowledged that the unusual
circumstances of INS ―present the most compelling case for protection
against appropriation.‖251
The 1976 Copyright Act and its legislative history provide still more
evidence against the preemption of hot news. Section 102(b) specifies that
certain elements contained within works of authorship do not fall under
copyright‘s scope: ―In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .‖252 More significantly,
the House Report discussing the 1976 Copyright Act explicitly indicates
that lawmakers intended for the hot news doctrine to survive preemption:
[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under
traditional principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of
unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the
literary expression) constituting ―hot‖ news, whether in the traditional
mold of International News Service v. Associated Press . . .
or in the newer form of data updates from scientific, business, or
253
financial data bases.

Some commentators have downplayed this language because the bill that
Congress ultimately passed deleted language that stated hot news

choosing which facts to include and in what order to place them—to receive protection
through copyright law).
246. Id. at 340.
247. See id. at 354 n.* (stating in a footnote that judgment was ultimately granted in
favor of Associated Press).
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. e. (1995).
250. Id.
251. Id. at cmt. c.
252. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
253. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.

misappropriation was saved from preemption.254 But the Second Circuit in
Motorola cited the House Report in asserting that ―it is generally agreed
that a ‗hot-news‘ INS-like claim survives preemption.‖255 The Second
Circuit stated that the central question was not whether hot news survived
preemption, but rather the ―breadth of the ‗hot news‘ claim that
survives.‖256 As illustrated in Part II.B, the breath is narrow, but sufficient
enough to provide news organizations relief from systematic free-riding.257
B. Hot News, Like Other Forms of Intellectual Property, Does Not
Undermine the First Amendment
The other major concern about hot news misappropriation is that it
violates free speech.258 To understand why this is not the case, it is
important to view the principles behind hot news in the same context as
other intellectual property protections that co-exist with the First
Amendment.259
Reconciling the First Amendment with the Constitution‘s so-called
―Copyright Clause‖ might seem infeasible at first glance. After all, the
First Amendment ensures the free flow of information and expression
while Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution allows authors to restrict the
free flow of certain information and expression.260 Yet the Supreme Court
acknowledges that both parts of the Constitution actually serve the same
goal of encouraging a robust exchange of ideas; each part just goes about it
a different way.261 While the First Amendment stands for the principle that

254. See Holte, supra note 4, at 28–29 (arguing that because Congress excluded such
language from its final legislation, their intent remains unclear).
255. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2nd Cir. 1997).
256. Id. at 850.
257. See supra discussion Part II.B.
258. See, e.g., Bayard supra note 129 (arguing that the First Amendment is an important
issue because it was not addressed by INS and because the doctrine has grown stronger over
the years); Art Brodsky, Oh, the Hypocrisy: First Amendment Attorneys Would Destroy the
Internet to Save Newspapers, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2009, 3:26 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-brodsky/oh-the-hypocrisy-first-am_b_204809.html
(denouncing added protections for the news industry because of the harm that would cause
to freedom of expression).
259. See Andrew L. Deutsch et al., „Hot News‟ and the „Duty to Police‟ It, LAW TECH.
NEWS (May 18, 2010)
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202458321278
(asserting that ―‗[h]ot-news‘ misappropriation is akin to, although not the same as, copyright
infringement‖).
260. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .‖), with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (―To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖).
261. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating that because the
Copyright Clause and First Amendment were both adopted about the same time, the
Framers must have viewed copyright‘s limited monopolies as compatible with free speech);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (asserting that

government censorship of expression harms the flow of information,
intellectual property protections stand for the principle that if authors are
not provided with economic incentives to create works that require
significant labor, fewer of such works will be created for society‘s
benefit.262
Because hot news misappropriation provides the same economic
incentives for useful works as other intellectual property protections, the
doctrine is not in conflict with the First Amendment. There are, of course,
important distinctions between the various intellectual property doctrines—
including copyright and hot news. As discussed in Part I.C, the Supreme
Court pointed out in Harper ―that copyright‘s idea/expression dichotomy
strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author‘s expression.‖263 Critics of hot news misappropriation
argue that by protecting the facts, hot news obliterates this careful balance
and treads on the First Amendment where copyright does not.264 However,
such an argument ignores the very real threat to free speech if free-riding is
allowed to continue unabated. If news organizations lack an economic
incentive to produce original journalism, the creation and dissemination of
information that the First Amendment purports to advance is harmed.265 As
one commentator noted, if every work of public interest could be pirated
away by a competitor, ―the public [soon] would have nothing worth
reading.‖266
Additionally, even though hot news misappropriation protects facts, this
protection is extremely limited. First, the five-part test established by the
Second Circuit in Motorola, and incorporated into this Comment‘s
―Motorola-plus‖ framework, makes it clear that the hot news doctrine does
not target members of the general public.267 Instead, the doctrine gives

intellectual property protections, specifically copyright law, encourage free expression by
providing authors with an incentive to create new ideas).
262. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 558 (explaining that copyright provides the economic
incentive to fuel new expression); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (noting that the right of publicity doctrine provided a performer
with the economic incentive to produce a work of public interest).
263. Harper, 471 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added) (citation and internal punctuation
omitted).
264. See Volokh, supra note 133 at 1070–71 (stating that if the Court were to confront
the issue of hot news and the First Amendment, it should rule that the doctrine is
unconstitutional).
265. See generally Marburger, supra note 4 (stating that the threat from free-riders will
lead to fewer news gatherers, which in turn undermines the idea exchange the First
Amendment was designed to encourage).
266. Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?,
19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971).
267. See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that hot news only survives preemption when five elements are met, including that
the defendant is in direct competition with the plaintiff).

news gatherers a right to stop only systematic free-riding by direct
competitors, and even then only for a limited time.268 Additionally, hot
news does not limit competitors from researching and reporting the same
facts on their own—it only prevents them from taking from others.269
Thus, concerns that hot news gives plaintiffs a monopoly on the facts are
overblown.
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed hot news
and the First Amendment, the Court has asserted that not all injunctions are
unconstitutional prior restraints.270 As discussed in Part I.C, subsequent
courts have stated that an injunction is valid if: (1) the justification for the
injunction
was
content
neutral,
and
(2) the injunction itself did not permanently bar expression.271
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that deciding whether a
particular regulation is content-based or content neutral can be difficult,272
hot news misappropriation is straightforward. Hot news is content neutral
because the doctrine on its face does not seek to restrict particular types of
facts; rather, the doctrine merely distinguishes the manner in which facts
were obtained (whether through original newsgathering or by free-riding
off someone else‘s work).273 The doctrine‘s objective is also unrelated to
content. The purpose is not to favor one type of reporting over another, but
to provide an economic incentive for original newsgathering so that
Americans can remain informed.274 The Court has made similar arguments
regarding other regulations that, like hot news misappropriation, were
aimed at preserving valuable existing media organizations, specifically free

268. Id.
269. See generally Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310,
341 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that the key element in hot news misappropriation is freeriding on another‘s work).
270. See Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (holding that
an injunction keeping protesters thirty-six feet from an abortion clinic did not violate the
First Amendment).
271. See supra notes 160–161 and accompanying text (basing the two-part test off the
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Madsen).
272. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (conceding that distinguishing
between content-based and content-neutral speech ―is not always a simple task‖).
273. Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994) (determining in a
First Amendment analysis that regulations requiring cable television systems to carry certain
channels were content neutral because the rules distinguished between the manner that
certain messages were transmitted to viewers, not the messages themselves).
274. Cf. id. at 649 (ruling that the cable television regulations were also content neutral
because they were designed to preserve free, over-the-air local broadcasting from the threat
of cable, not because broadcast television was considered more valuable); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49
(2001) (asserting that copyright law protections are content neutral because they provide
economic incentive for the creation and dissemination of works, rather than taking a
position on a particular viewpoint).

over-the-air broadcast television stations against another then-emerging
threat: cable.275
Besides being content neutral, granting injunctive relief for hot news
misappropriation does not permanently bar expression. Like the district
court‘s ruling in the decision that preceded Motorola, in which the judge
stated that the defendant was ―not totally thwarted‖ in its efforts to use
particular facts,276 the same principle applies to hot news cases in general.
Free-riders who are faced with an injunction but wish to publish the facts
have two readily available options: they can either independently confirm
the facts, at which point they will have a complete defense to hot news
misappropriation, or they can wait for the time limit created by the
injunction to expire.277
After all, hot news misappropriation—as
recommended by this Comment and as applied by the courts—only
restricts the use of the facts for a limited time.278 Moreover, although the
Supreme Court has said that prior restraint ―freezes‖ speech at least for as
long as the injunction lasts,279 that is not the case with hot news. An
injunction against a free-rider in no way prohibits the public from accessing
the facts.
Finally, in any argument involving hot news and concerns about the First
Amendment, it is important to keep in mind a statement made by Justice
Robert H. Jackson more than 60 years ago. ―There is danger,‖ Justice
Jackson said, ―that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into
a suicide pact.‖280 Justice Jackson, writing a dissenting opinion in
Terminiello v. City of Chicago,281 was expressing concern that the Court
had gone too far when it overturned a ―breach of peace‖ ordinance in
Chicago on First Amendment grounds.282 The majority held that one
purpose of free speech was to invite unrest and even stir people to anger.283
Thus, the Court reversed the conviction of Arthur Terminiello, who was
fined for giving a speech in which he criticized numerous racial groups,
angering the crowd that had gathered to the extent that police could not
275. See supra notes 273–274.
276. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 1071, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff‟d in part, vacated in part, Nat‘l Basketball
Ass‘n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
277. See generally Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310,
345 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (establishing a time limit before the defendant could use the bank‘s
facts).
278. See supra notes 221–229 and accompanying text (explaining that the time limit
depends on the unique facts of each case).
279. Neb. Press Ass‘n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
280. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
281. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
282. Id. at 13–14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
283. See id. at 4 (majority opinion) (asserting that speech is often provocative and that‘s
why it is protected against censorship).

maintain order.284 Justice Jackson, however, explained that Terminiello
was not being prevented from speaking, only that he could not claim the
Constitution prohibited him from being punished.285 Jackson also warned
that over the long run, free speech would become more endangered if
people were not protected from its abuses.286
Like the suicide pact that Jackson articulated in Terminiello, the
Constitution‘s First Amendment protections should not be used to destroy
news organizations while supporting the abuses of free-riders; to do so
would undermine—not advance—the purposes of free speech.
CONCLUSION
The news industry is very much in peril. The recent closings of daily
newspapers like the Rocky Mountain News in Denver and the Seattle PostIntelligencer reflect the economic pressures facing the media as more
readers get their news online.287 News organizations are evolving to meet
these needs.288 Yet unless something is done to stop free-riders from
systematically rewriting fresh, original news reporting—often gathered at
considerable cost—and undercutting its value by selling bargain-rate ads,
the industry‘s ability to adapt could be thwarted.289
Hot news misappropriation is an important solution that, if carefully
applied to INS-like situations, avoids federal preemption and does not
conflict with the First Amendment. Specifically, courts should adopt the
―Motorola-plus‖ framework that incorporates the five-element test
established in National Basketball Ass‟n v. Motorola, Inc.290 while ensuring
that the plaintiff is not required to show statistical proof that its business
has been damaged.291 This framework also suggests that courts limit
284. Id. at 3.
285. See id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (―A trial court and jury has found only that in
the context of violence and disorder in which it was made, this speech was a provocation to
immediate breach of the peace and therefore cannot claim constitutional immunity from
punishment.‖).
286. See id. at 24 (noting that real discussion ―dries up and disappears‖ when people
realize there is no law and order).
287. See Future of Journalism Debated in US Senate, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (May 6,
2009), available at
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gWvGizqEZzkGqCUEJZjb6ldVjc
Bw (reporting that both papers were ―casualties of the dramatic change in the media
landscape brought about by the emergence of the Internet‖).
288. See FTC Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 19, at 1, (stating that as old business
models collapse in the Internet era, new forms of journalism are emerging).
289. See generally Marburger, supra note 4 (concluding that while newspapers have
managed to adapt to myriad changes over the years, including radio and television, the
threat from free-riders is even greater and may be insurmountable unless action is taken to
protect those who compile fresh news).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 198–200 (discussing the five elements that must
be met for a hot news misappropriation claim to survive federal preemption).
291. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text (explaining that the courts should
be able to infer that such damages would occur, much as the Supreme Court did in INS).

successful hot news misappropriation claims to situations in which the
information provides a useful benefit to society292 and where the plaintiff
obtained the protected information first.293 Critics are wrong to suggest
that hot news has no place in the law. If courts carefully apply the doctrine,
hot news misappropriation can be used to benefit society when no other
form of intellectual property protection applies.

292. See supra text accompanying notes 208–213 (asserting that by grounding hot news
misappropriation in public policy, the doctrine‘s protections are justified for the same reason
as other intellectual property laws).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 216–218 (discussing situations when this
element will be met and when it likely will not).

